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Research Questions: 
What are the key provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
that have impacted the pricing considerations of health actuaries and the consumers of 
healthcare in the individual and small group markets in the United States? Can the 
effects of the age and tobacco related rating restrictions be quantified? 
Introduction 
In the United States, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or 
ACA) drastically altered the health insurance industry. Insurers are no longer able to 
deny coverage or charge higher premiums based on an individual’s medical history. In 
order to “more evenly spread the financial risk borne by issuers and help stabilize 
premiums,” risk-sharing provisions dubbed the “3 R’s” (risk adjustment, risk corridors, 
and reinsurance) were instituted in the individual and small group market (“Summary 
Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment 
Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). With these recent events in mind, there are two 
objectives for this research exercise. Firstly, there will be a discussion of the various 
changes brought about by the ACA that impact the considerations of actuaries pricing 
individual and small group medical insurance and the consumers of healthcare in the 
United States. After having established the implications of these recent changes, health 
insurance premium data from the Washington Office of the Insurance Commissioner will 
be used to analyze the effects of specific health insurance rating restrictions 
implemented by the ACA. 
In order to comprehend the Affordable Care Act’s relevance to actuaries, it is 
critical to first understand the role of actuaries in the health insurance industry. 
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Actuaries are sometimes described as financial engineers responsible for assessing risk 
and ensuring the financial security of their organization. Their work includes, but is not 
limited to analyzing data, setting reserves, developing predictive models, and 
forecasting future claims and premiums. These tasks are impacted by risk adjustment, 
reinsurance, and risk corridors along with many other provisions and changes made by 
the Affordable Care Act. As such, it is paramount that they understand what changes 
have been made and how they alter traditional actuarial methods and strategies. The 
finer details of these changes will be discussed in great detail in the following analysis, 
but for the purposes of this introduction, I will provide a list of the various topics for the 
research exercise. They are as follows: guaranteed issue, family 3-child cap for 
individual market rating, the health insurance marketplace, actuarial value, essential 
health benefits, age bands and tobacco usage, reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk 
corridors. After having addressed these topics, I will be conducting a statistical analysis 
to provide quantitative evidence of how actuaries have been affected by the 
aforementioned rating restrictions including age bands and tobacco usage related 
restrictions. 
Significant Changes Impacting Healthcare Providers 
Introduction 
Prior to the implementation of the ACA, insurers and their actuaries had 
significantly more freedom in how they priced their medical insurance. In theory, 
premiums were based primarily on the expected costs associated with the risks of their 
enrollees. However, with the advent of certain legislation including age bands, tobacco-
usage related pricing restrictions, risk adjustment, etc., actuaries are not only more 
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limited in how they can price their insurance, but are additionally required to consider 
more closely the decisions being made by their competitors in the market. The following 
pages will seek to shed light on these topics and others to highlight how both actuaries 
and consumers of healthcare have been affected by these changes. 
Guaranteed Issue 
 Guaranteed issue is likely the most tangible change for health insurance 
consumers in the individual market brought about by the Affordable Care Act. As of 
2014, the ACA prevents the denial of medical insurance coverage to an individual 
because of a preexisting condition. In the past, medical insurance providers could 
refuse coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions. Insurers could also elect to 
extend coverage to these individuals with the caveat of charging a higher premium. The 
practice of using medical or health information to assess an applicant’s eligibility for 
medical insurance is known as medical underwriting. Under the ACA, this practice has 
been eliminated in the individual marketplace. This means that insurers must offer 
coverage to individuals (and families) regardless of their current medical state. 
Additionally, individuals with conditions ranging from back pain to cancer cannot be 
charged a higher premium based on their medical history (“Marketplace Health Plans 
Cover Pre-Existing Conditions”). 
The Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and Medicaid are also unable 
to refuse coverage or charge more because of an individual’s medical history. One 
exception to guaranteed issue exists in regards to grandfathered individual health plans. 
Note that grandfathered plans are plans that existed prior to March 24, 2010 and have 
not had changes that reduced benefits substantially or increased costs for consumers. 
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These plans are not required to cover preexisting conditions. If an individual is facing 
the situation in which their insurer does not cover a preexisting condition, then they may 
be inclined to switch insurance providers, and can elect to purchase a different health 
insurance plan through a health insurance marketplace (also known as a health 
exchange) (“Marketplace Health Plans Cover Pre-Existing Conditions”). The health 
insurance marketplace will be discussed further below. 
Family 3-Child Cap for Individual Market Rating 
 Another change brought about by the ACA that clearly impacts health insurance 
consumers is the implementation of a 3-child cap for individual market rating. The 
official Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) technical summary imposes 
“a cap of no more than three covered children under the age of 21 whose per member 
rates are taken into account in determining the family premium” (“Overview: Final Rule 
for Health Insurance Market Reforms”). What this means in practice is that the premium 
for a family with more than three children under the age of 21 will only be based on the 
price of insurance for three of the children under 21. For example, assume there were 
two families with the same insurance coverage composed of identical age and gender 
configurations and three children under the age of 21. Then assume one of the families 
were to have a fourth child. Under this ACA ruling, the insurance premiums for the two 
families would remain identical even after one family’s addition of the fourth child. 
The Health Insurance Marketplace 
 The health insurance marketplace (also known as the health exchange) was 
created with the intent to be “a resource where individuals, families, and small 
businesses can: learn about their health coverage options; compare health insurance 
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plans based on costs, benefits, and other important features; choose a plan; and enroll 
in coverage” (“Health Insurance Marketplace”). The health insurance marketplace is 
also the means by which individuals can apply for coverage through the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and Medicaid or apply for government subsidies for 
their health insurance. Private insurers are permitted to sell health insurance plans on 
the exchange as well, but in order to do so, the plans must meet certain requirements. 
These requirements additionally apply to all private plans, including individual, small 
group, large group, and self-insured plans in which employers contract administrative 
services to a third party payer. The only exception is in the case of grandfathered plans, 
which are not bound by these requirements (“Preventive Services Covered by Private 
Health Plans under the Affordable Care Act”).  
Among these requirements is a set of preventive services that must be covered 
without charging a copayment or coinsurance. This list is long and varied, but examples 
include mammograms, blood pressure screening, diet counseling, immunizations, and 
vision screening for children (“Preventive Services Covered by Private Health Plans 
under the Affordable Care Act”). Marketplace plans also have restrictions in regard to 
maximum out-of-pocket costs. For 2014 the maximum out-of-pocket costs for an 
individual plan and family plan were $6,350 and $12,700 respectively (Andrews). For 
2015 the maximum out-of-pocket costs for an individual plan and family plan were 
$6,600 and $13,200 (“Out-of-Pocket Maximum/limit”). Money paid in deductibles, 
coinsurance, and copays all contribute to these limits, and once the limit has been 
reached, the insurance company is responsible for 100% of the costs for covered care. 
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These changes should benefit individuals purchasing non-grandfathered plans by 
guaranteeing preventive benefits and limiting their out-of-pocket costs. 
Actuarial Value 
 Actuarial value is defined as a measure of the “relative generosity” of the benefits 
covered by a given health insurance plan. The actuarial value indicates the “average 
share of medical spending that is paid by the plan, as opposed to being paid out-of-
pocket by the consumer.” This value is given as a percentage, and takes into account 
the plan’s cost-sharing features including copyaments, out-of-pocket maximums, 
deductibles, and coinsurance. These actuarial values can be used to categorize plans 
into different “metal” tiers. Bronze, silver, gold, and platinum plans have actuarial values 
of 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% respectively. The government provides insurers a 
calculator which can be used to determine the actuarial value of their plans. For those 
enrolling in health insurance plans, it is critical to again note that the actuarial values or 
metal tiers are intended to calculate the “average share of medical spending” paid by 
the plan, and the true percentage can and will vary for plans within the same metal tier 
(American Academy of Actuaries). 
Essential Health Benefits 
The concept of essential health benefits (abbreviated EHBs) was also introduced 
to the health insurance industry through the Affordable Care Act. The ACA requires 
non-grandfathered health plans to cover items and services from the following ten 
benefit categories: “(1) ambulatory patient services, (2) emergency services, (3) 
hospitalization, (4) maternity and newborn care, (5) mental health and substance use 
disorder services including health and behavioral health treatment, (6) prescription 
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drugs, (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, (8) laboratory services, (9) 
preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, and (10) pediatric 
services including oral and vision care.” These EHBs are to be “equal in scope to a 
typical employer health plan.” EHBs are defined by state specific EHB-benchmark plans 
(“Information on Essential Health Benefits (EHB) Benchmark Plans”). Note that this 
allows for situations in which the essential health benefits are defined differently from 
one state to the next. 
Age Bands and Tobacco Usage 
One unquestionably notable reform under the ACA relates to the implementation 
of “age bands.” Providers are now limited to a 3:1 ratio between the premiums paid for 
the most elderly members and the youngest adult members. Children have a single age 
band spanning from 0 to 20 years of age. Adults have one-year age bands beginning at 
age 21 and ending at age 63. There is also one final age band for all individuals 64 and 
older. States were permitted to use a narrower age curve if they submitted relevant 
information to the government by March 29, 2013. Otherwise they would be required to 
use the age curve seen below (“Summary Report on Transitional Reinsurance 
Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment”). 
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Table 1 
 
Age Bands 
 
Age 
Premium  
Ratio 
Age 
Premium  
Ratio 
Age 
Premium  
Ratio 
0-20 0.635 35 1.222 50 1.786 
21 1.000 36 1.230 51 1.865 
22 1.000 37 1.238 52 1.952 
23 1.000 38 1.246 53 2.040 
24 1.000 39 1.262 54 2.135 
25 1.004 40 1.278 55 2.230 
26 1.024 41 1.302 56 2.333 
27 1.048 42 1.325 57 2.437 
28 1.087 43 1.357 58 2.548 
29 1.119 44 1.397 59 2.603 
30 1.135 45 1.444 60 2.714 
31 1.159 46 1.500 61 2.810 
32 1.183 47 1.563 62 2.873 
33 1.198 48 1.635 63 2.952 
34 1.214 49 1.706 64 and Older 3.000 
  
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Summary Report on Transitional 
Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment Transfers for the 2014 Benefit 
Year.” 30 June 2015. Web. 11 Jan. 2016. 
 In tandem with the above table, rates for tobacco users are allowed to vary no 
more than 1.5:1 for any one age group. For example, a tobacco using individual 64 
years and older may only be charged up to 4.5 times more than a 21 year-old who does 
not use tobacco. Tobacco use is defined as “the use of a tobacco product or products 
four or more times per week within no longer than the past 6 months by legal users of 
tobacco products and includes all tobacco products.” States and issuers are also 
permitted to implement a stricter tobacco rating factor within 1:1 and 1.5:1 should they 
choose to do so (“Overview: Final Rule for Health Insurance Market Reforms”). 
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Introduction to the 3 R’s 
As a result of the above changes, the Affordable Care Act included three 
provisions collectively referred to as premium stabilization programs, which are more 
commonly known as the “3 R’s.” The “3 R’s” refer to reinsurance, risk adjustment, and 
risk corridors. The ultimate goal of these premium stabilization programs is to support 
the ACA’s mission to provide consumers with affordable health insurance coverage by 
reducing incentives for health insurers to avoid enrolling sicker people and stabilizing 
premiums in the individual and small group health insurance markets (“Premium 
Stabilization Programs”). Reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment will be 
discussed further in the following paragraphs. 
Reinsurance 
The concept of reinsurance is not new in the health insurance industry. 
Reinsurance is a type of an insurance offered to insurers as a means of mitigating large 
losses. The “Transitional Reinsurance Program” was implemented by the ACA to 
“stabilize premiums in the individual market inside and outside of the Marketplace” (“The 
Transitional Reinsurance Program - Reinsurance Contributions”). Note that reinsurance 
payments are only made for claims on members in non-grandfathered individual plans. 
Since an individual can no longer be denied coverage because of a preexisting 
condition, insurance companies face higher risk pools than in the past, and reinsurance 
can dampen the effects of larger claims. The concept is that this “transitional” (meaning 
temporary) program works to stabilize premiums by dissuading insurers from inflating 
premiums to protect themselves from the new risk pool. The intent is that by 2017 
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(when the reinsurance program ends), insurers should have better data to use when 
pricing their products. 
For the 2014 benefit year, the original attachment point, reinsurance cap, and 
coinsurance rate were $60,000, $250,000, and 80% respectively. The attachment point 
and coinsurance rate were later changed to $45,000 and 100% respectively (“Summary 
Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and Permanent Risk Adjustment 
Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). The original attachment point for 2015 was 
$70,000, but it was later changed to $45,000. The reinsurance cap for 2015 was 
$250,000 with a coinsurance rate of 50% (as of 6/18/15). The proposed 2016 
reinsurance attachment point and reinsurance cap are $90,000 and $250,000 
respectively with a coinsurance rate of 50% (Perlman, Norris, Leida). As in years past, if 
reinsurance contributions exceed reinsurance payments, the coinsurance may be 
changed to ensure that the contributions collected are expended (Cigna). The table 
(Table 2) and formula below illustrate how the reinsurance payment is calculated where 
𝑥 is the sum of an individual’s claims for the year, 𝐴 is the attachment point, 𝐵 is the 
reinsurance cap, 𝐶 is the coinsurance rate as a percentage, and 𝑓(𝑥) equals the 
reinsurance payment to the insurer for the given individual. 
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Table 2 
 
Reinsurance Parameters 
 
Year 
Attachment  
Point 
Reinsurance  
Cap 
Coinsurance Fee 
2014 $45,000  $250,000  100% $63  
2015 $45,000  $250,000  50% $44  
2016 $90,000  $250,000  50% $27  
 
Source: Perlman, Daniel, Doug Norris, and Hans Leida. “Transitional Reinsurance at 
100% Coinsurance: What It Means for 2014 and beyond.” Milliman. 24 June 2015. Web. 
11 Jan. 2016. 
Reinsurance Payment Calculation: 
𝑓(𝑥) = {
0, 𝑥 ≤ 𝐴
(𝑥 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝐶, 𝐴 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝐵 
(𝐵 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝐶, 𝑥 > 𝐵
 
 
A sample reinsurance calculation for 2015 is provided below with the following 
assumptions: 
 Total claims for an individual in a given year = $150,000 
 Attachment point = $45,000 
 Reinsurance cap = $250,000 
 Coinsurance rate = 50% 
𝑓($150,000) = [($150,000 − $45,000) ∗ .50] = $52,500  
In order to fund the transitional reinsurance program, $63 will be collected per 
member per year in 2014 from “health insurance issuers and certain self-insured group 
health plans offering major medical coverage that is part of a commercial book of 
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business.” Also note that for the purpose of reinsurance contributions, major medical 
coverage is defined as “a catastrophic plan, an individual or a small group market plan 
subject to the actuarial value requirements under 45 CFR (Code of Federal 
Regulations) 156.140, or health coverage for a broad range of services and treatments 
provided in various settings that provides minimum value as defined in 45 CFR 
156.145” (“The Transitional Reinsurance Program - Reinsurance Contributions”). This 
means that while reinsurance payments are only made to claims in the individual 
market, contributions will come from major medical plans from the individual, small 
group, and large group markets and self-funded group major medical plans. A full 
breakdown of businesses required and not required to fund the federal reinsurance 
program is represented in Table 3 below (Cigna). 
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Table 3 
Reinsurance Contributions 
Reinsurance Fee 
Business affected 
·          Insured individual and group major medical plans 
·          Self-funded group major medical plans 
·          Taft-Hartley Plans to the extent the plans meet other criteria for inclusion 
·          Group retiree medical plans covering individuals who are not eligible for Medicare or for whom 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaMedicare is the secondary player 
    o         (includes active employees age 65+ and pre-65 retirees) 
·          Medical Plans that are integrated with a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) 
·          Short-Term Abroad (STA) expatriate plans 
·          Self-funded expatriate plans (in 2014 only) 
Business excluded 
·          Standalone pharmacy and behavioral health plans 
·          Standalone dental and vision plans 
·          Hospital indemnity and specified disease plans 
·          Private Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, state and federal high-risk pools and basic health plans 
·          Coverage for post-65 retirees and disabled individuals where Medicare is the primary payer 
·          Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) 
·          Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) 
·          Employee Assistance Plans (EAPs), disease management programs and wellness programs 
·          Stop-loss and indemnity reinsurance policies 
·          Military health benefits 
·          Indian Health Service Coverage 
·          Insured expatriate coverage 
·          Self-funded expatriate plans (in 2015 and 2016) 
 
Source: Cigna. “Reinsurance Fact Sheet.” (2015): Web. 11 Jan. 2016. 
Risk Adjustment 
 Risk adjustment is likely to be the most significant topic of discussion for 
actuaries working in the post-ACA marketplace. Unlike reinsurance and risk corridors, 
risk adjustment will persist indefinitely beyond 2016. The concept of risk adjustment is 
fairly simple, but the implementation of this risk-sharing mechanism is complicated. 
Essentially risk adjustment “redistributes funds from plans with lower-risk enrollees to 
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plans with higher-risk enrollees” for non-grandfathered plans in the individual and small 
group markets (“Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk Adjustment, Reinsurance, and 
Risk Corridors”). The intent is to have plans that are priced based on the market 
average risk, as opposed the risk of their prospective enrollees. This proposition 
becomes challenging when examining the means by which the risk adjustment transfer 
payments are calculated. Below is the risk adjustment transfer formula which “averages 
all individual risk scores in a risk adjustment covered plan, makes certain adjustments, 
and calculates the funds transferred between plans” (Kautter). The details of these 
certain adjustments and their implications are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
 
𝐴𝑅𝐹𝑖: Allowable rating factor 
𝐴𝑉𝑖: Actuarial value of plan i’s metal 
level 
𝐺𝐶𝐹𝑖: Geographic cost factor 
𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑖: Induced demand factor 
𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖: Plan liability risk score 
𝑃s: statewide market average plan 
premium 
𝑠𝑖: plan’s share of marketwide 
enrollment 
𝑇𝑖: Transfer amount
 
In order to better understand the formula, it is critical to begin with the CMS’s 
given definitions of the variables used. The plan liability risk score reflects “a plan’s 
actuarial value as well as the plan’s enrollee health status risk (including health risk due 
to age),” and is calculated using the CMS-HCC model. This will be discussed further in 
the next section. The induced demand factor reflects “the anticipated induced demand 
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associated with the plan’s (metal) level.” Put another way, an insurer would expect that 
with richer benefits, they would see higher utilization of these benefits. For example, if 
one plan had comparably cheaper copayments versus another, one might expect the 
enrollee to use the benefits more often. Therefore, this induced demand factor might be 
greater for a gold plan than a bronze plan. The geographic cost factor “reflects the 
medical cost structure in the geographic location of the plan’s enrollees.” The allowable 
rating factor “reflects the impact of the age composition of each plan’s enrollees on the 
premiums it would collect from enrollees.” Actuarial value was defined previously as a 
means of measuring benefit richness represented as a percentage of the “average 
share of medical spending” paid by the plan (Pope et al.). The remaining variables 
(statewide market average plan premium, plan’s share of marketwide enrollment, and 
transfer amount) are self-explanatory. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the focus will be specifically on interpreting the 
intent of this formula and how it practically alters traditional actuarial pricing 
considerations. Firstly, there exists significant unknowns in the above formula: ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑖  
and 𝑠𝑖. The first unknown (∑ 𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑖 ) represents the sum of the marketwide plan liability 
risk scores, and the second unknown (𝑠𝑖) represents the plan’s share of marketwide 
enrollment. While an actuary may be able to estimate their own company’s plan liability 
risk score using the HHS-HCC risk adjustment model, it will be significantly more 
challenging for them to estimate the plan liability risks scores of their competitors. 
Milliman actuaries Mary van der Heijde and Jordan Paulus state that, “It is difficult – if 
not impossible—to estimate risk transfer payments based on a carrier’s risk score 
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alone” (Van der Heijde, Paulus). Similarly, a plan’s market share changes from year to 
year and is also impacted by the other plans offered by the insurer and its competitors. 
The goals of the risk adjustment program as described by the CMS were to 
provide “payments to health insurance issuers that attract high-risk enrollees, such as 
those with chronic conditions,” reduce “the incentives for issuers to avoid those 
enrollees,” and lessen “the potential influence of risk selection on the premiums that 
plans charge” (“Summary Report on Transitional Reinsurance Payments and 
Permanent Risk Adjustment Transfers for the 2014 Benefit Year”). As a result, actuaries 
have to seriously consider how their enrollees compare with the rest of the market and 
how their insurer’s plan designs and corresponding premiums may impact the 
composition of their enrollees. For example, assume that in the state of Washington a 
particular insurer offered the cheapest gold plan in the individual market. As a result, 
they may gain a large share of business from individuals looking for budget gold tier 
plans, but this demographic may be different than that of another more expensive gold 
tier plan offered by another insurer. As a result, the plan liability risk score for this 
cheaper gold plan would vary from other gold plans in the market. 
Consider another situation where an insurer focuses its marketing heavily on 
young healthy adults. In the past, this was more common practice as insurers benefitted 
heavily from having healthier enrollees. Now in the post-ACA market insurers have to 
consider whether having a higher proportion of healthier individuals is actually 
financially beneficial, as they may forfeit profits if their plan liability risk scores are 
significantly lower than the market average. The ultimate intent here is to display how 
this implementation of risk adjustment has dramatically altered the mindset of traditional 
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actuarial practices. No longer can actuaries focus primarily on planning for the risk 
profile of their typical demographic of enrollees. They must also direct their gaze 
towards the rest of the market and ensure that their plans and pricing do not place them 
in an unfavorable position when it comes time to submit their insurer’s claims data for 
risk adjustment.  
The HHS-HCC Risk Adjustment Model 
 The Department of Health and Human Services Hierarchical Condition 
Categories risk adjustment model (abbreviated HHS-HCC) is used in the ACA’s risk 
adjustment provision to evaluate the plan liability risk scores for insurers in the individual 
and small group markets. A risk adjustment model (merely one factor in the risk 
adjustment transfer payment formula discussed above) “uses an individual’s 
demographics and diagnoses to determine a risk score, which is a relative measure of 
how costly that individual is anticipated to be” (Kautter).  
The CMS-HCC risk adjustment model (which has been used in the past for risk 
adjusting Medicare Advantage plans) was the basis for the HHS-HCC risk adjustment 
model. Changes were then made to reflect the different conditions existing in the 
individual and small group markets post-ACA versus the Medicare Advantage market. 
Notably, since Medicare populations were used in developing the CMS-HCC model, 
adjustments needed to be made to reflect a demographic consisting of more than 
seniors and disabled individuals. Additionally, the sample size for certain diagnoses (i.e. 
pregnancy or neonatal complications) in the Medicare population are quite low when 
compared with the commercially insured population. A final change relates to the type of 
medical spending that is reflected in the risk score. The CMS hierarchical condition 
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categories “are configured to predict non-drug medical spending” while the HHS-HCCs 
“are configured to predict the sum of medical and drug spending” (Kautter). 
This leads into one of the greatest challenges associated with risk adjustment 
models. According to Milliman, “perfect risk adjustment” would result in a market where 
“insurance carriers would theoretically be indifferent to “risk” associated with the 
members they enroll” (Leida, Katterman). In order for the risk adjustment program to be 
successful, the risk adjustment mechanism must be able to accurately reflect cost 
differences associated with different demographics and risk scores. It must 
simultaneously protect insurers with high-risk enrollees and reduce financial incentives 
for insurers trying to target a particular demographic with lower associated claims costs. 
The resulting challenge for risk adjusters is creating a model that can predict current 
medical claims costs. However, as a result of constant changes occurring in the 
healthcare field due to factors such as fluctuations in the price of prescription drugs, the 
creation of new prescription drugs, advances in medical technology, and others, the 
model needs to be frequently reevaluated.  
Another concern for insurers and their actuaries relates to the importance of 
coding. Because risk scores are based on the diagnosis codes for an enrollee in the 
given year, “timely coding and processing of claims is important to ensure that all 
conditions are flagged by April of the following calendar year” (Van der Heijde, Paulus). 
In order to maximize profits/minimize losses from risk adjustment, accurate and detailed 
coding is essential, and could make a considerable difference when the government 
calculates the risk adjustment transfer payments. Therefore, differences in the 
George 20 
 
thoroughness and precision of coding from one insurer to the next can have profound 
impacts on the risk adjustment transfer payments. 
Risk Corridors 
 The third component of the 3 R’s is risk corridors, and applies to individual and 
small group qualified health plans from 2014-2016. The specific goal of the risk 
corridors provision is to protect health insurers against the “pricing uncertainty of their 
plans” in the post-ACA marketplace by “temporarily dampening gains and losses in a 
risk-sharing arrangement between issuers and the federal government.” Risk corridor 
payments are calculated by comparing “allowable costs” to a “target amount.” Allowable 
costs consist of claims costs plus certain adjustments including reinsurance, risk 
adjustment, and health information technology costs. The target amount consists of 
premiums minus allowable administrative costs. The allowable administrative (non-
claim) costs do allow a certain margin for profit. The ratio of allowable costs to target 
costs dictates whether the insurer will owe or be owed a risk corridor payment. The 
table below (Table 4) illustrates how the fee or reimbursement is calculated, where x is 
equal to the allowable costs over the target costs (Norris, Van der Heijde, Leida). 
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Table 4 
Risk Corridor Calculations 
Allowable Costs/Target Costs Result 
0.92>xaaaaa 80% Fee 
0.92<x<0.97 50% Fee 
0.97<x<1 aa No Fee 
Wa1<x<1.03 No Reimbursement 
l1.03<x<1.08 50% Reimbursement 
aaaaax>1.08 80% Reimbursement 
 
Source: Norris, Doug, Mary van der Heijde, and Hans Leida. “Risk Corridors Under the 
Affordable Care Act.” SOA Health Watch 73 (2013): 5–10. Print. 
When interpreting the above table, note that if the ratio of allowable costs to 
target costs is greater than one, the premium collected was less than required, and if 
the ratio is less than one, then the premium collected was more than required. The 
above table results in three potential situations. If a given plan’s ratio of allowable costs 
over target costs is within 1±0.03, the plan does not pay any fees or receive any 
reimbursement. For the next five percentage points (i.e. 0.92-0.97 or 1.03-1.08), the 
gains or losses are split 50/50 between the insurer and the government. Lastly, for any 
gains or losses beyond those points (i.e. <0.92 or >1.08), the plan keeps either 20% of 
the gains or is reimbursed 80% of the losses. 
Ignoring for a moment the complexity inherent in the risk corridors formula, there 
exist other considerations for actuaries and insurers regarding this provision. As 
illustrated above, the risk corridors program is symmetric and two-sided. Originally, this 
provision of the ACA was not required to be budget neutral, meaning that risk corridor 
payments did not have to equal risk corridor reimbursements. In late 2014, the passing 
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of the Cromnibus bill required that “2014 risk corridor receivables paid in 2015 be 
funded through payables into the program from other insurers.” An announcement from 
the CMS on October 1st of 2015 revealed what “many industry analysts foresaw”: 
severe underfunding of the program. Insurers can now expect to receive a mere 12.6% 
of their 2014 risk corridor receivables in 2015. This leads to concerns regarding 
potential 2015 and 2016 receivables because those insurers that were underfunded for 
2014 will be first in line to collect payments in later years (assuming the funds are 
available) (Katterman). 
Before leaving the subject of risk corridors, it is important to consider what 
caused this funding shortfall. Milliman actuary Scott Katterman proposes a number of 
potential causes in his article titled “Headwinds cause 2014 risk corridor funding 
shortfall.” The most notable of these proposed causes relates to the reality that the 
health insurance market favors plans in a risk corridors receivables position. Katterman 
states that, “all else being equal, lower-priced plans are more likely to be in a risk 
corridor receivables position while higher-priced plans are more likely to be in a 
payables position.” Assuming equivalent benefits, lower-priced plans generally result in 
greater enrollment when compared to higher-priced plans. Therefore, the market will 
have a higher concentration of enrollment in the lower-priced plans when compared with 
higher-priced plans, and these lower-priced plans are more likely to be in a receivables 
position because of the lower premiums. Additionally, had it not been for the changes to 
reinsurance for 2014 (decreased attachment point and increased coinsurance rate), the 
risk corridors program would have been in an even less favorable position (Katterman). 
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Conclusion of ACA Changes 
 Healthcare consumers have immediately felt the impacts of specific aspects of 
the ACA including guaranteed issue, the family 3-child cap, and the creation of the 
health insurance marketplace. Meanwhile, the new legislation has necessitated many 
changes in regards to actuaries’ work in the health insurance industry. Actuaries have 
been further incentivized to perform market analyses in order to best manage the risks 
of their employers in 2014 and beyond, and must consider a variety of new factors in 
addition to the risk profiles of their target demographic. It has also been demonstrated 
how this new legislation has imposed restrictions on how actuaries can price their plans. 
The above topics will be considered heavily when performing the following analysis 
regarding the changes necessitated by the post-ACA marketplace. 
Rating Restrictions Analysis 
 The following pages will consist of a statistical analysis comparing changes in the 
relative pricing of health insurance premiums in 2013 versus 2014. The data for the 
following analysis was provided to me by the Washington State Office of the Insurance 
Commissioner (Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner Health 
Insurance Rate Filing Database). This government office is, among other things, 
responsible for reviewing all health insurance rate filings and ensuring that an insurer’s 
rates are actuarially sound and work within the established legislation governing health 
insurance plans. The dataset is complete, meaning that my analysis was conducted 
using every premium from every insurer in Washington in 2013 and 2014. Note that the 
insurer Moda was formerly known as ODS. They are treated as the same company for 
the purpose of comparing data from 2013 and 2014. For the following tables, an “N/A” in 
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the 2013 column indicates the insurer was not a part of the Washington individual 
market in 2013. The “SD” column will present the corresponding standard deviation of 
the average ratio or factor. In total, rates were gathered from 14 different insurers with a 
sum of 92 plans in 2013 and 95 plans in 2014. 
As detailed previously, 2014 brought about age-related pricing restrictions 
(known as age bands) and tobacco usage related rating restrictions. As a reminder, 
recall that the ACA age bands required that the ratio of health insurance premiums for 
children (defined as individuals aged 0-20) versus adults aged 21 is 0.635:1. The ACA 
also requires the ratio of health insurance premiums for individuals aged 64 and older 
versus individuals aged 21 to be 3:1. Finally, the ACA has required that the ratio of 
health insurance premiums for tobacco versus non-tobacco using individuals of the 
same age to be no greater than 1.5:1.  
In order to quantify the significance of these restrictions, the health insurance 
premiums from 2013 and 2014 in the Washington individual market were compiled 
through the aforementioned source. After compiling and organizing the rates, the 
following three statistics were calculated and reformatted as tables: the average ratio of 
premiums for children versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 and 2014 (Table 5), the 
average ratio of premiums for individuals aged 64 and older versus individuals aged 21 
in 2013 and 2014 (Table 6), and the average tobacco rating factor for 2013 and 2014 
(Table 7). 
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Table 5 
Average ratio of premiums for children versus individuals aged 21 
 
 The above table (Table 5) serves to compare the average ratio of premiums for 
children versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 versus 2014. The 2013 values were 
calculated using a two-step process. Firstly, the premium for children was divided by the 
premium for adults aged 21 for each individual plan in an insurer’s portfolio. Then, these 
ratios were summed and divided by the total of number of plans offered by the given 
insurer. The identical 2014 ratios are a result of the government-mandated age bands. 
Also, we see high standard deviations for the 2013 plans offered by both Group Health 
Cooperative and Group Health Options. In looking at the data in more detail, both 
insurers offered two plans with low out-of-pocket maximums that generated ratios which 
did not align with the rest of their plans. Both insurers have similarly high standard 
deviations for the 2013 statistics in the below tables as well. Moving on, we see that no 
insurer in 2013 had a ratio even within 0.1 of the required ratio in 2014. In fact, four of 
the ten insurers that participated in the 2013 individual market offered the exact same 
rate to children and adults aged 21. This indicates that in the 2014 Washington 
Insurer 2013 2014 Average Ratio SD Average Ratio SD
Asuris 13 6 1.000 0.000 0.635 0.000
BridgeSpan N/A 3 N/A N/A 0.635 0.000
Community Health Plan of Washington N/A 3 N/A N/A 0.635 0.000
Coordinated Care Washington N/A 3 N/A N/A 0.635 0.000
Group Health Cooperative 8 7 0.766 0.093 0.635 0.000
Group Health Options, Inc. 8 3 0.741 0.094 0.635 0.000
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW 20 13 1.000 0.000 0.635 0.000
LifeWise Health Plan of WA 6 15 0.836 0.015 0.635 0.000
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS) 14 2 0.833 0.007 0.635 0.000
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc. N/A 2 N/A N/A 0.635 0.000
Premera Blue Cross 1 23 0.757 0.000 0.635 0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon 9 6 1.000 0.000 0.635 0.000
Regence Blue Shield 13 6 1.000 0.000 0.635 0.000
Time Insurance Company N/A 3 N/A N/A 0.635 0.000
Number of Plans 2013 2014
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individual market, the health insurance premiums for children have decreased relative to 
the premiums for adults aged 21.  
Table 6 
Average ratio of premiums for individuals aged 64 and older versus 21       
 
  The above table (Table 6) serves to compare the average ratio of premiums for 
individuals aged 64 and older versus individuals aged 21 in 2013 and 2014. This 
calculation was performed by the exact same method as described above, except in this 
case the premium for individuals aged 64 and older was divided by the premium for 
Insurer Number of Plans Average Ratio SD Average Ratio SD
Asuris 13 3.666 0.011 3.668 0.008
BridgeSpan N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Community Health Plan of Washington N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Coordinated Care Washington N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Group Health Cooperative 8 3.339 0.391 3.341 0.398
Group Health Options, Inc. 8 3.326 0.384 3.334 0.393
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW 20 3.745 0.005 3.746 0.004
LifeWise Health Plan of WA 6 3.732 0.030 3.711 0.019
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS) 14 3.722 0.022 3.716 0.022
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Premera Blue Cross 1 3.440 0.000 3.446 0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon 9 3.672 0.007 3.663 0.007
Regence Blue Shield 13 3.669 0.009 3.669 0.012
Time Insurance Company N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Insurer Number of Plans Average Ratio SD Average Ratio SD
Asuris 6 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
BridgeSpan 3 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Community Health Plan of Washington 3 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Coordinated Care Washington 3 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Group Health Cooperative 7 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Group Health Options, Inc. 3 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW 13 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
LifeWise Health Plan of WA 15 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS) 2 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc. 2 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Premera Blue Cross 23 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon 6 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Regence Blue Shield 6 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
Time Insurance Company 3 3.000 0.000 3.000 0.000
2013
Non-Smoker Smoker
Non-Smoker Smoker
2014
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individuals aged 21. We again can note a change in this comparison where every single 
insurer in the Washington 2013 individual market was required to make significant 
changes to their pricing of insurance premiums in 2014. We see ratios in 2013 as low as 
3.326 and as high as 3.746. This indicates that in 2014 health insurance premiums for 
individuals aged 64 and older were less costly relative to premiums for individuals aged 
21 than in the previous year. The above two tables could be collectively interpreted to 
illustrate how a greater proportion of health insurance premiums has fallen on 
individuals aged 21 than in years past. Both the oldest and youngest enrollees have 
seen their premiums decrease relative to individuals aged 21. This could be good news 
for both enrollees with children and older individuals, while individuals aged 21-24 (who 
occupy identical age bands with a factor of 1) have seen their premiums increase 
relative to other demographics. From an actuary’s perspective, this is certainly limiting 
as it is possible (if not likely) that given the previous year’s ratios, the age bands have 
created a situation in which the relative premiums are not reflective of the actual change 
in costs associated with different ages. 
Table 7 
Average Tobacco Rating Factor  
 
Insurer 2013 2014 Average Factor SD Average Factor SD
Asuris 13 6 1.147 0.022 1.150 0.000
BridgeSpan N/A 3 N/A N/A 1.150 0.000
Community Health Plan of Washington N/A 3 N/A N/A 1.000 0.000
Coordinated Care Washington N/A 3 N/A N/A 1.000 0.000
Group Health Cooperative 8 7 1.193 0.031 1.200 0.000
Group Health Options, Inc. 8 3 1.194 0.031 1.200 0.000
Kaiser Foundation Healthplan of the NW 20 13 1.208 0.010 1.200 0.000
LifeWise Health Plan of WA 6 15 1.162 0.027 1.075 0.000
Moda Health Plan, Inc. (formerly ODS) 14 2 1.162 0.024 1.000 0.000
Molina Healthcare of Washington, Inc. N/A 2 N/A N/A 1.000 0.000
Premera Blue Cross 1 23 1.158 0.024 1.075 0.000
Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon 9 6 1.147 0.022 1.150 0.000
Regence Blue Shield 13 6 1.147 0.022 1.150 0.000
Time Insurance Company N/A 3 N/A N/A 1.200 0.000
Number of Plans 2013 2014
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  Lastly, we come to the table comparing the average smoking factor in 2013 
versus 2014 (Table 7). This calculation was a two-step process. Firstly, the premium for 
a tobacco user was divided by the premium for a non-tobacco user for every age of 
every plan in an insurer’s portfolio. Then the average of these ratios was computed. 
Effectively, this means the average consisted of 45 ratios multiplied by the number of 
plans offered by the insurer. For example, LifeWise offered six plans in 2013, so the 
number of ratios used in calculating the average was 6*45, or 270. This 45 comes from 
adding the one age band spanning years 0-20, 43 separate age bands for individuals 
aged 21-63, and the final age band for individuals 64 and older. 
 Recall that the ACA implemented a cap of 1.5 for this tobacco user rating factor. 
The above table indicates that in Washington no insurer was anywhere near reaching 
that limitation, and with the exception of Moda, insurers did not change their tobacco 
rating factor by more than 0.01. As a purely speculative observation, it is possible that 
Moda and the three other insurers with a 1.0 tobacco rating factor have attempted to 
strategically target the population of tobacco users by making it such that their rates for 
tobacco users and non-tobacco users are the same. The ultimate conclusion from this 
table is that in the Washington individual market, the tobacco rating restriction has had 
no limiting effect on health insurance pricing.  
Conclusion of Analysis 
  The above tables quantitatively demonstrate how the Affordable Care Act altered 
the actuarial pricing of medical insurance in the Washington individual market. The age 
bands were particularly restrictive, forcing every single insurer to make significant 
changes to their relative premiums. It was noted how these restrictions have effectively 
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placed a greater burden on individuals aged 21 versus children and seniors. This is 
particularly enlightening, as this design reflects the intent of the healthcare reform. In 
the past, actuaries primarily focused on pricing to the risks associated with their current 
and target demographics, but now these age-related rating restrictions have 
necessitated a redistribution of the burden of the costs of healthcare. On the other hand, 
there is little to no evidence that the tobacco rating restriction had any meaningful effect 
on the 2014 Washington individual market.  
Final Thoughts 
  The purpose of this thesis was twofold. Firstly, the key provisions of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act were examined in order to better understand how 
the pricing considerations of health actuaries and the consumers of healthcare were 
affected. These changes specifically included guaranteed issue, the family 3-child cap 
for individual market rating, the health insurance marketplace, actuarial value, essential 
health benefits, age bands and tobacco usage, reinsurance, risk adjustment, and risk 
corridors. It has been illustrated how both individually and together these changes have 
significant implications for actuaries working to price health insurance in the individual 
and small group markets.  
Secondly, a statistical analysis was conducted in an effort to quantify the 
significance of specific age and tobacco related rating restrictions in the Washington 
individual market. It was found that the age bands were the most significant restrictor, 
while the tobacco rating restriction had no discernible impact on rating. Furthermore, the 
data demonstrated the intent behind the design of the healthcare reform, and the 
effective redistribution of costs on young adults. 
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Unquestionably, there exists a great number of questions related to healthcare 
reform that are yet to be answered, and countless statistical analyses are currently 
being performed by actuaries to quantify the risks associated with these changes. 
Certain demographics will undeniably benefit from this recent healthcare reform, 
particularly those who were denied coverage because of preexisting conditions. 
Insurers and actuaries have, in turn, seen the complexity of their work dramatically 
increase. Profit margins will be further restricted by risk adjustment and risk corridors, 
and the number of pricing considerations for their actuaries has significantly increased. 
Only time will tell the stability and sustainability of this new system, but without question, 
the demand for health actuaries has increased, and their roles have become 
increasingly complicated. 
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